



McLibel

Reputation damage writ large

By Judy Kuszewski

McDonald's decision to sue two activists in the 1990s meant that all its business practices were laid bare in court, which changed the company for ever

Happy Meals, World Cup tie-ins and Extra Value Combos are the main messages on walking into any of McDonald's 32,000 restaurants world-wide. However, all manner of controversies – everything from the obesity crisis and “supersize me” debate, through to allegations of litter creation, employee mistreatment and factory farming – have dogged the golden arches over the decades.

But perhaps none of these controversies has been more damaging than the notorious McLibel case of the 1990s – dubbed by the UK's Channel 4 news as “the most expensive and disastrous public relations exercise ever mounted by a multinational company”. It is a tale of David and Goliath, an unusual legal climate, Pyrrhic victory and unintended consequences.

The case involves Helen Steel and Dave Morris – the so-called McLibel Two – both activists involved with a campaigning collective known as London Greenpeace (no relation to Greenpeace International) in the 1980s.

Steel and Morris were taken to court by the burger chain for their role in publishing a fact sheet – What's Wrong With McDonald's? – in 1986 that levelled a wide range of allegations against the company. It included claims of promoting unhealthy food, animal cruelty, anti-union activity, bad working conditions and contributing to starvation in the developing world.

Most disturbing of all to McDonald's was the claim that the company's beef was implicated in loss of tropical rainforest.

However, as Matt Haig argues in his 2003 book *Brand Failures: The Truth About the 100 Biggest*

Branding Mistakes of All Time, “very few people would now know about the contents of that pamphlet if McDonald's hadn't taken the matter to court”.

Through the 1980s, allegations of the company's complicity in rainforest destruction were aired by the BBC2 Nature programme, as well as appearing in articles in the Independent newspaper's magazine and in the Sunday Correspondent.

In all of these cases (and others), the company's response was to have its law firm send a demand for an apology and retraction of the allegations, or face the threat of a defamation lawsuit under Britain's famously strict libel laws, which require defendants to prove the truth of their allegations. In the cases of Channel 4, the BBC and many others, the recipients of the legal threats gave in to McDonald's demands, rather than face the expense and uncertainty of prevailing on a libel case in a British court.

Deforestation suggestion

Also caught up in the controversy were John Elkington and Julia Hailes, co-founders of London-based consultants SustainAbility. In 1987 Elkington and Hailes co-authored *The Green Consumer Guide*, the bible of environmental consumerism, which included a mention of McDonald's beef having been accused of involvement in tropical deforestation.

This prompted McDonald's to threaten an injunction to remove the book from sale. Elkington says: “I understand McDonald's didn't initially notice the book coming out, but noticed increasing numbers of young people coming into restaurants

“The most expensive and disastrous public relations exercise ever mounted by a multinational company”
Channel 4 News

and asking questions.” The legal advice was not encouraging. He says: “We were told by a very senior lawyer in London we were very unlikely to prevail – unless, that is, we wanted to ‘play poker’. We looked at the legal situation and felt, in fact, we could prevail.”

When McDonald’s leaned on Elkington and Hailes to retract the rainforest allegation, the pair put forward two conditions. First that McDonald’s implement a well-thought-out environmental policy across its operations. And second that the company develop a means to be able to tell, through the supply chain, whether its meat did or did not come from areas that had recently been forested.

Elkington and Hailes eventually met with McDonald’s, but before their meeting, Elkington says, the company sent its director of purchasing supply around critical markets to get sworn affidavits from key suppliers. “They showed us they had an environment policy, though it looked stitched together. They did try to show that following the controversy they’d looked at the issues. I wasn’t totally persuaded, but at least they’d made the effort.”

Writs blitz

The tendency of most recipients of McDonald’s legal threats to acquiesce created a certain momentum that favoured McDonald’s in future legal battles. Fiona Donson wrote in *Legal Intimidation*, published in 2000: “By invoking the law in support of its reputation, McDonald’s has been able to create an impression that any criticism that is withdrawn as a result of the threat of a libel action must in some way have been ‘unlawful’.”

What set Steel and Morris apart was their refusal

The McLibel verdict

The judge in the case found the McLibel Two had proved some of their allegations, and failed to prove others.

Proved:

- Child exploitation via company advertising
- Falsely advertising McDonald’s food as “nutritious”
- Cruelty to animals
- McDonald’s food represents a health risk to long-term customers
- McDonald’s is “strongly antipathetic” to unions and pay low wages

Not Proved:

- Complicity in rainforest destruction
- McDonald’s food causes cancer and heart disease
- Implicated in starvation in the developing world
- Bad working conditions

to do likewise, even with no legal representation and no means to support themselves through the long process.

And long indeed it was. Writs were served in September 1990, the case went to trial in July 1994 and ended in December 1996, with the court judgment handed down in June 1997. After over 100 witnesses, and millions of pounds spent by both the British courts and McDonald’s – the company’s costs were estimated at £10m – the McLibel trial was the longest trial of any kind in English legal history.

When it came, the judge’s verdict was something of a victory for McDonald’s. Judge Rodger Bell found the defendants had not proved some of the allegations in the pamphlet – including those relating to rainforest destruction – but had proved others. Steel and Morris were ordered to pay the company £60,000 in damages, later reduced to £40,000.

But the victory was hollow. Perhaps magnanimously, the company stated it would not seek to collect the money – but in truth, the damage done to



Global icons need global sustainability

“McDonald’s showed us they had an environment policy, though it looked stitched together”
John Elkington

McDonald's reputation was already so overwhelming that to chase a pair of penniless, well-meaning activists over such modest damages would have hurt the company far further. And, McDonald's was not awarded costs, so had to cover its £10m legal expenses.

In the process of taking the pair to trial, McDonald's ensured that every allegation against the company was examined in minute detail in open court. Witness statements, documentary evidence and legal arguments were open to the light of day – and to the general public through the media and the famous McSpotlight website – like never before. In addition to having been found to have proved some of the pamphlet's allegations, this reputational damage gave Steel and Morris a substantial moral victory.

The case is a European example of the so-called Slapp (strategic lawsuit against public participation) phenomenon – lawsuits designed to squelch criticism of a company or government agency on an issue of public interest. Traditionally, the Slapp suit, as applied in the US, is never expected to reach trial, much less prevail. It is only designed to intimidate critics and would-be critics.

While the British libel suit is still alive and well – with more recent manifestations such as the Trafigura superinjunction – such actions seem to be on the decrease in the US, where the courts have proved increasingly hostile to Slapp actions.

McProgress

And what is the legacy of the McLibel case? Elkington says: "Though I think McDonald's are in the wrong business – meat consumption will be a major flashpoint over the next 10-20 years – I think they've made a lot of progress. They were very early into the effort to drive out antibiotics from the meat supply. I do think the McLibel incident is part of what sensitised McDonald's to the wider agenda. Things were accumulating, and this is one of those instances that added up, rather than being a defining moment."

More recently, in 2006, McDonald's was a key player in a campaign spearheaded by Greenpeace to remove rainforest soya from chicken feed in the company's supply chain. This time, instead of arguing with activists, McDonald's emerged an unlikely champion.

Daniela Montalto of Greenpeace's forest campaign says: "In this instance, McDonald's immediately recognised the nature of the problem and sought not simply to put its own house in order, but to use its might to push a multimillion dollar industry towards a more sustainable future."

McDonald's very quickly agreed to get soya from the Amazon out of its chicken feed. But it did more, Montalto says, forming an alliance with other retailers that put pressure on agribusiness interests operating in Brazil to stop destroying the rainforest.



Morris and Steel: made of stern stuff

The resulting moratorium on Amazon soya is still in place.

Montalto argues that the "action taken by McDonald's and other companies to tackle deforestation for soya in the Amazon, and their current engagement on the issue, continues to send a strong and clear message to the soya sector that their customers want to contribute to solutions, not deforestation".

The McLibel trial's postscript came in 2005, when Steel and Morris won a judgment against the British government in the European court of human rights for denying the pair legal aid – as was government policy in libel cases – even though the defendants were of very limited means. The court found the two were denied a fair trial and ordered the government to pay the pair £57,000 in damages and costs. New criteria have been instituted which may help defendants in a similar position in the future.

McDonald's then issued a statement saying: "Although the so-called McLibel case came to court in 1994, the allegations related to practices in the 80s. The world has moved on since then and so has McDonald's."

The company wouldn't give an interview to Ethical Corporation about the case, but did comment: "It isn't a decision we would make today. We learnt from our experience, and understand why it is often used as a CSR case study."

Despite the heroics often attributed to Steel and Morris, the McLibel Two tend to keep a low profile. In a McSpotlight webchat in 2005 Morris said: "[We] are nobody special – the McLibel case was only successful because of the voluntary work of so many people helping out behind the scenes in so many heroic ways."

Morris argues that the focus should not be on the McLibel Two, but "to appreciate all the good people around you and get something going to change the world where you live". ■

"We learnt from our experience, and understand why it is often used as a CSR case study"
McDonald's UK

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Tokyo Electric Power

Ethical meltdown

By Jon Entine

Tokyo Electric Power has a history of mismanagement and serious safety lapses

In 1998, Kei Sugaoka, a Japanese-American nuclear inspector who was a senior engineer for General Electric and often worked at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant (as GE did contract work there), discovered a cracked steam dryer, a metal component that removes water vapour from steam before it flows into the turbines. He informed his superiors at Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), operators of the plant, who were obligated to report the incident to regulators. The revelations could have forced the operator to do what utilities least want to: undertake costly repairs.

According to CBS News, Sugaoka “received an order that horrified him: edit out footage showing cracks in plant steam pipes in video being submitted to regulators”. What happened next was an example, critics have since said, of the collusive ties that bind Japan’s nuclear power companies, regulators and politicians.

For a while Sugaoka did nothing, but eventually filed a written report to the authorities. Instead of immediately deploying investigators to Daiichi, Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (Nisa) instructed the company to inspect its own reactors and take whatever action it deemed appropriate. Despite a new law shielding whistle-blowers, Nisa divulged Sugaoka’s identity to Tepco. He was fired and effectively blackballed from the industry he had worked in for more than two decades.

But the news eventually came out after Sugaoka pressed the case with Nisa. By the summer of 2003, Tepco was forced to close all 17 of its nuclear plants temporarily after admitting that it had faked safety reports for more than a decade.

An investigation revealed its executives had actu-

ally hidden other, far more serious problems, including cracks in the shrouds that cover reactor cores. It was also revealed that in 1978, control rods at one Fukushima reactor dislodged but the accident was not reported because utilities were not then required to notify the government of such accidents.

Moved, but not removed

One would think that a scandal of this magnitude would have rocked Tepco and forced a major reorganisation of its culture and safety practices. But according to a report in the New York Times, after Tepco’s cover-up became public, its chairman and president, who had been forced to resign, were given advisory posts at the company.

Other executives were demoted, but later took jobs at companies that do business with Tepco. Still others received tiny pay cuts for their role in the cover-up. Following a temporary shutdown and repairs at Daiichi, Tepco resumed operating the plant. Soon afterwards, the company received permission from the Japanese regulators for a 10-year extension in the operating life of the oldest of Daiichi’s reactors.

Then in 2007, the utility said it hadn’t come entirely clean years earlier. It had concealed at least six emergency stoppages at its Fukushima Daiichi power station and a “critical” reaction at one unit that lasted for seven hours. No action was taken against it.

Whether inconsistent or unenforced regulations played a role in these and the most recent incident is an open question, but this is no way for a country to oversee a technology that has the potential for catastrophic disasters. It raises disturbing questions

Engineers who challenged safety claims became outcasts for threatening a lucrative industry



Tepco's president Masataka Shimizu resigned, calling for change

about whether any government is capable of enforcing regulations on industries that are critical and have enormous political and economic clout.

"Everything is a secret," Sugaoka has said to the Associated Press. "There's not enough transparency in the industry."

The nuclear industry and government officials in Japan are compatriots in what is popularly referred to as the "nuclear power village". Watchdog Nisa is known as a cushy home for Tepco officials either on the way out or the way in. From 1959 to 2010, four former top-ranking ministry officials successively served as vice-presidents at Tepco.

Profit motive

In the past, engineers who challenged safety claims became village outcasts for threatening the money flow in a lucrative industry, losing out on consulting opportunities and promotions. Until the most recent accident, says Kusuo Oshima (in the New York Times), it was political suicide even to discuss the need to reform the industry. Oshima is one of the few governing Democratic Party lawmakers who have challenged the nuclear industry.

Japan's two-decade-long economic purgatory has also played a role in perpetuating the status quo. Costly renovations get in the way of building new plants, which create construction projects, jobs and community subsidies.

Consequently, the union-backed Liberal Democrats, which ruled Japan for more than 50 years until 2009, were tight with management and had a backbone of jelly when pushing for reforms. Then, when the Democratic Party came to power 20 months ago, it pledged to reform the nuclear industry and

strengthen Nisa, but efforts soon fizzled.

Can things change? Blather about corporate responsibility – including "commitments" to create "a system of individual responsibility and initiative" – on Tepco's website is not enough.

When the president of Tepco, Masataka Shimizu, resigned in May, he said he and his company took "responsibility for this accident. "There must be change," he declared. He was succeeded by insider Toshio Nishizawa, a senior executive at Tepco, who had previously headed the planning department.

Under the government rescue plan, management responsibilities will effectively be taken away from the company and placed in the hands of an independent supervisory body in an effort to make sure that profits are set aside for victims.

To what degree government oversight will ensure that Tepco, and the Japanese nuclear industry, can establish a culture of accountability remains to be seen. At least for now, Tepco's reputational capital appears to be spent, even though in the end, a nuclear catastrophe following the recent earthquake and tsunami has been averted.

The disaster will be costly to Tepco and its shareholders, and will reverberate throughout the regional economy. Perhaps even more disturbing, in the long run, it might derail international support for nuclear energy, which is a necessary part of the energy demand mix.

But what happened to Tepco's nemesis? Kei Sugaoka took another job at a nuclear facility in Taiwan but abandoned the industry in 2000 and returned to the Bay Area in California, where he grew up. Since 2000, he has worked part-time as a security guard and basketball referee. ■

Tepco's responsibility claims

Tokyo Electric Power talks a good game. On the company's website it makes a number of **claims** about how it has been acting in a responsible manner, learning from previous mistakes:

"In September 2002, Tepco implemented **countermeasures** to guard against a reoccurrence of **incidents** with regard to inspection and maintenance operations at our nuclear power stations. At the same time, the company announced **four commitments** in the interest of creating a 'corporate system and climate of individual responsibility and initiative'. The actualisation of the four commitments has been adopted as our **social mission**, and the entire company is deeply involved in the effort."

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Social media and environmental campaigning: Brand lessons from Barbie

Posted by [Rachel Stine](#) [1] on Aug 5, 2011

Rachel Stine reports on how Greenpeace has used social media to put pressure on big brands over allegations of environmentally irresponsible sourcing

Only seven months into the year, Barbie has already accomplished an impressive number of personal and career goals in 2011. In addition to partying it up in Malibu, the eleven-and-a-half-inch plastic doll has started a new career as an architect, launched a clothing line at Uniqlo, reunited with her soulmate and fellow doll Ken Carson, and also, according to Greenpeace, taken on a new hobby: killing rainforests.

Concentrating on the plastic blonde beauty, the leading environmental campaign group launched a social-media-heavy campaign on June 7, 2011 against toy companies Mattel, Disney, Hasbro and Lego for sourcing packaging materials from endangered Indonesian rainforests through controversial supplier Asia Pulp & Paper [APP].

The advocacy group has primarily relied upon social media to publicise the toy companies' environmental damage and encourage the general public to contribute to the campaign.

The power of new media

The relative success of Greenpeace's campaign during its first two months reveals the potential of social media in ethical campaigns. Furthermore, the toy companies' responses to this campaign offer lessons for others on how to address to such ethical confrontations.

Although Greenpeace is lobbying against multiple toy companies, its main campaign is aimed at Mattel and has used Barbie's boy toy Ken as its spokesperson. Greenpeace initiated the campaign in early June by releasing a spoof [YouTube video](#) [2]. The spoof plays on Mattel's current advertising campaign which involves Ken winning Barbie back after seven years apart.

In the YouTube video, Ken discovers Barbie's deforestation habits in Indonesia and dramatically ends their recently renewed relationship. Ten days after it was first uploaded, the YouTube clip was viewed over a million times in multiple languages, according to Greenpeace in July 2011.

The day after the video's release, Greenpeace spread Ken's anguish further by hanging a giant banner on Mattel's El Segundo headquarters which showed Ken's frowning face declaring, "Barbie, It's Over. I Don't Date Girls That Are Into Deforestation."

Facebook and Twitter front and centre

In addition to these initial promotions, Greenpeace's biggest campaign maneuver was its use of Facebook and Twitter to incorporate the public in its attack against the toy companies. Greenpeace

directed users on the social media sites to confront Mattel via Barbie's pages and also send e-mails directly to Bob Eckert, Mattel's CEO.

The resulting influx of hundreds comments on Barbie's [Facebook page](#) [3] caused Mattel to shut off comments for days and delete any mention of rainforests. Within days, almost 200,000 e-mails complaining about producing toy packaging from rainforest materials were sent to Mattel's offices, according to Greenpeace.

"[O]ur campaign to stop toy packaging from wrecking Indonesia's rainforests is all about challenging a company's most valuable asset - their brands. In the case of Mattel, who we proved was using rainforest fiber in their Barbie packaging, we relabeled Barbie as a rainforest destroyer - as we felt this was the exact opposite to what Mattel would want," says Ian Duff, Greenpeace's forest campaigner in the UK.

Greenpeace also sponsored social media pages for the heartbroken Ken, so users could lend their support and follow the latest campaign updates and news. Ken's Greenpeace Twitter page, [ken_talks](#) [4], includes tweets such as, "Yes, love is blind - I guess mine was blind to Barbie's appetite for rainforest destruction!"

Greenpeace International's main Facebook page dedicated to lashing out against Barbie has over 900,000 likes and has included a contest for users to design a "Rainforest Destroyer look" for the doll.

Company responses

The pumped up publicity and the public's considerable contributions to the campaign show how social media can be used to effectively promote a call for action.

On the surface, social media offers campaigns potential access to gargantuan numbers of users. But coupled with that access is the little effort required for users to act on behalf of a cause on social media sites.

Pummeled with criticism from Greenpeace and the public, the toy companies' responded to the campaign in varying ways, while APP has denied any role in cutting down rainforests in Indonesia.

Thus far, Lego has taken the most active response by announcing the day after the launch of the campaign that the company will no longer buy packaging from any supplier that contributes to deforestation and therefore will no longer purchase from APP.

Before the campaign was launched, Lego was in the midst of developing a new policy to minimize the impact of its packaging on forests, says Helle Sofie Kaspersen, vice president for Lego's corporate governance and sustainability.

With the new policy already in the works, Lego was able to respond quickly to the Greenpeace campaign by announcing its new policy early. The new policy aims to reduce total packaging, use as much recycled materials as possible and use only Forest Stewardship Council sources for the needed virgin fiber, and will be implemented in the near future, says the company.

Mattel, Hasbro, and Disney, however, have been criticised by campaign groups and their followers using social media for failing to adequately address Greenpeace's concerns.

After initially referring to Greenpeace's campaign as "an inflammatory approach", Mattel published a press release stating that the toy company has instructed its suppliers to no longer source from APP. Mattel also publicised that it will develop a sustainability policy which will require suppliers to commit to sustainable forestry management practices.

No instant agreement

Although Greenpeace acknowledged Mattel's response as a decent start, the environmental organization claimed that the firm's press release was vague and lacked timelines for the company to implement the promised changes.

Hasbro has directed their suppliers to stop using APP, but is relying on its sustainability announcements from 2010 to address the problem and has not established any new policies.

Unless Hasbro develops a new policy with firm timelines, Greenpeace believes that Hasbro toys are still at risk for being packaged in rainforest materials.

In mid-July, Disney issued a statement declaring that the company is assessing the challenges of its complex supply chain, and acknowledged that deforestation is an urgent issue in Indonesia. The statement highlighted aspects of Disney's current environmental policy and its intention to expand its paper policy; however, it did not mention the company's involvement with APP.

Greenpeace has not acknowledged Disney's statement at present.

Mattel and Hasbro have not responded to Ethical Corporation's request for comment at the time of publication, while Disney declined to comment beyond its press release.

APP has attempted to repudiate Greenpeace's report with a press release that aimed to invalidate the environmentalists' allegations.

In the release, Aida Greenbury, APP's managing director of sustainability, said that Greenpeace's report contained "false and misleading claims" about APP's practices and sustainability commitments.

APP recently released a new commercial centering on its "reforestation" efforts to create a "greener Indonesia". The commercial is airing across Western media, including on Sky television, which partners with WWF to help stop deforestation. WWF's attempts to work with APP to stop deforestation in the past have failed.

Lessons for other firms

In light of the campaigning against the toy companies and APP, all companies have the opportunity

to learn a few lessons as to how to respond to social media ethics campaigns.

When faced with a campaign, a company should first respond quickly by communicating with the campaigning organization and examining the claims against them, advises Scott Poynton, executive director and founder of [The Forest Trust](#) [5], an NGO which works with large firms such as Nestlé to prevent deforestation in the supply chain.

“Keeping below the radar and taking a long time to respond seems to suggest that the organization is either a) guilty or b) not responding properly to the situation,” agrees James Lythe, who works in crisis management for security and risk monitoring firm Control Risks.

According to Scott Poynton, being open to the campaigners message is key. Fighting with campaigners, by exchanging incriminating press releases or through another means, will only add to damaging publicity and, if the campaign allegations are true, allow poor practices to continue within the company.

When communicating with campaigners, companies should strive to seek information from the organization rather than approaching talks in attack and defend mode, stresses Poynton.

Assuming that well-known and respected campaigners are extremists and treating them as such is a mistake, in his opinion. Rather, companies should approach campaigners like customers, especially because of the organizations’ ability to influence consumers, and address their concerns accordingly.

Though an ethical campaign can initially shower a company with bad publicity, by effectively responding to the claims a company can ultimately win back favorable publicity.

“Every crisis has the opportunity to benefit a company if they respond well to it,” says Lythe of Control Risks.

Furthermore, campaign organizations that genuinely seek change will often work with the offending company to improve management practices.

“Greenpeace has a long history of ongoing constructive engagement with companies that it previously campaigned on,” says Duff on behalf of Greenpeace. He points to the environmentalist organization’s work with Nestlé.

Past successes count

Originally, Greenpeace campaigned to stop the chocolate company from sourcing material from Golden Agri-Resources [GAR], the palm oil arm of Sinar Mas. As a result of the campaign, Nestlé established a new no deforestation policy, and consults Greenpeace regularly. The incident also contributed to GAR developing a new forest conservation policy.

Kaspersen of Lego says that Greenpeace’s knowledge and expertise in environmental matters worked as a valuable tool as the toy company developed its new packaging policy.

Yet Seb Hempstead, the Vice President for Brandwatch in North America, warns of companies falling prey to short-lived campaigns embedded in social media. "I'm often surprised when we see how some stories die away very quickly online, like anything else these campaigns are competing for our attention alongside many other distractions on the web," he says. According to him, overreacting to a fading online campaign may escalate the issue further. That said, Greenpeace and other campaigners have targeted APP for around a decade, and seem set to continue.

Although the campaign began with a bang, Greenpeace may need to sustain the momentum of the campaign if it hopes to keep the pressure on the toy companies.

At present, the environmental organization has lowered the public profile of the Barbie campaign. There have not been any new developments in the attack against the doll during recent weeks, and Greenpeace's `ken_talks` tweets have dwindled in frequency.

Deforestation criticisms on Barbie's Facebook page have trickled down to a few per day, far outnumbered by fans admiring on the doll's fashion and personal life.

Tiger death

On July 25, Greenpeace attacked APP by publicising the death of an endangered Sumatran tiger after being caught in an animal trap for six days on the edge of an area allegedly being logged by APP in Indonesia. Making further use of online media, Greenpeace released the news on its blog and included video footage of the tiger caught in the trap before it died during a rescue attempt.

The actor Stephen Fry, who has more than 2.8 million Twitter followers, then tweeted a recent [open letter](#) [6] to APP, written by consultant and Ethical Corporation columnist Brendan May. Many others followed suit.

A few days after the incident, APP publicised its successful capture, relocation and release of another Sumatran tiger. The tiger was removed from "an area where humans and tigers come into conflict" and relocated to Sembilang National Park, according to APP's [Rainforest Realities](#) [7] website.

However, Greenpeace claimed that the area where the tiger was captured is also where APP has cleared considerable tracts of rainforest for timber. The environmental organization criticised APP's promoted efforts, stating that the recent conflicts between humans and the endangered species have been caused by APP cutting down the tigers' habitat in Indonesia.

Greenpeace has also criticised APP's new "reforestation" series of advertisements when they were released in print and on television during Greenpeace's campaign this summer.

As for the toy companies, Greenpeace's latest stunt involved activists dressed as Santa Claus and Mr. Monopoly crashing Hasbro's Christmas toy preview in London on July 13, 2011.

Greenpeace continues to publish regular updates and news on its campaign against the involvement of APP and toy companies in rainforest destruction on its website at greenpeace.org.

Though the campaign is expected to continue, its promotion seems to have taken a back seat to Greenpeace's more recent campaigns, including its new "Detox" campaign against Nike and Adidas which launched in mid-July.

Greenpeace remains insistent that the toy companies stop using rainforest fiber in their packaging, and expects the companies to cease buying from APP and develop much stronger sustainability policies, says Duff, of the campaign group.

While some of the companies have started to meet those requirements, Greenpeace will quickly escalate the campaign again if the toy companies resume using rainforest materials, he says.

Links:

[1] <http://www.ethicalcorp.com/users/rachel-stine>

[2] <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/forests/asia-pacific/barbie/>

[3] <http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/barbie>

[4] http://twitter.com/#!/ken_talks

[5] <http://www.tft-forests.org>

[6] <http://maydayblog.com/a-frank-and-open-letter-to-asia-pulp-paper>

[7] <http://www.rainforestrealities.com>